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 II.-1 
UNDER FIRE: EVALUATING AS-APPLIED 
CHALLENGES TO DISARMING THE 
INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED 
Abstract: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) prohibits previously committed persons from pur-
chasing or possessing firearms. On March 11, 2020, in Mai v. United States, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that 
§ 922(g)(4) burdens the Second Amendment rights of individuals no longer living 
with mental illness. It then agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals—the 
lone other circuit to reach the question—in holding that intermediate scrutiny ap-
plies. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the provi-
sion survives intermediate scrutiny. The Third Circuit also considered an as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(4), but it did not address the scrutiny issue because it held 
that the law does not burden constitutionally protected conduct. This Comment ar-
gues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is correct because it does not give undue 
weight to ambiguous historical evidence in determining the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections and it demonstrates appropriate deference to Congress. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Mental illness and hatred pull[ed] the trigger, not the gun.”1 That was 
President Donald Trump’s message to the American people following a week-
end in August 2019 in which nearly one hundred people were killed or injured 
during two separate mass shootings.2 Tragically, one of the attackers was able 
to secure a gun despite a federal law that barred him from doing so.3 That pro-
                                                                                                                           
 1 President Donald Trump, Remarks on the Mass Shootings in Texas and Ohio (Aug. 5, 2019) 
(transcript available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-mass-shootings-texas-ohio/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NN-BM62]). Despite President Trump’s 
claim, the relationship between mental illness and violence is complicated. See Lois Beckett, Myth vs. 
Fact: Violence and Mental Health, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/myth-vs-fact-
violence-and-mental-health [https://perma.cc/Q5WF-BKBK] (June 18, 2014) (explaining that, alt-
hough individuals living with serious mental illness pose an increased risk of violence, most people 
living with mental illness will never be violent). 
 2 Trump, supra note 1. On August 3, 2019, a gunman killed twenty people and injured twenty-
seven others at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas. Campbell Robertson et al., Back-to-Back Outbreaks of 
Gun Violence in El Paso and Dayton Stun Country, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/08/04/us/mass-shootings-dayton-el-paso.html [https://perma.cc/FY55-UXHL]. The next 
day, a man shot up an entertainment district in Dayton, Ohio, killing nine and injuring nearly thirty 
others. Id. 
 3 Dan Frosh & Sadie Gurman, Texas Shooter Had Been Banned from Buying Firearms Because 
Mentally Unfit, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-shooter-had-been-
banned-from-buying-firearms-because-mentally-unfit-11567540321 [https://perma.cc/DYU4-BZAR]; 
see § 922(g) (barring certain classes of people from buying or possessing firearms). Section 922(g)(4) 
II.-2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
vision, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), bans individuals who have been involuntarily 
committed from buying or possessing firearms.4 
In 2020, in Mai v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) did not violate the Second Amendment 
as applied to a plaintiff who had allegedly recovered from his mental illness.5 
The decision is significant because the United States has almost 400 million 
guns and more than eleven million adults living with a serious mental illness.6 
Moreover, previously committed persons already pose a significant suicide 
risk, and evidence suggests that firearm access only increases that danger.7 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Gun Control Act of 1968, the general 
framework federal courts use to resolve Second Amendment challenges, and 
the factual and procedural background of Mai.8 Part II discusses the circuit 
split between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits with respect to as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(4).9 Finally, Part III maintains that the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach is correct because it does not give undue weight to founding-era gun 
laws, and it evaluates congressional decision making under an appropriately 
deferential evidentiary standard.10 
                                                                                                                           
prohibited the Texas gunman from purchasing or possessing a firearm because a court had previously 
found him to be “mentally unfit.” Frosh & Gurman, supra; see § 922(g)(4) (barring individuals previ-
ously “adjudicated as a mental defective” from buying or possessing firearms). 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). A firearm is any weapon that utilizes an explosive to discharge a projec-
tile. Id. § 921(a)(3). It includes the frame or receiver of the firearm (the portion that contains the firing 
mechanism), any device used to muffle or silence a firearm, and any destructive device, such as a 
bomb or grenade. Id. §§ 921(a)(3), 921(a)(4). An involuntary commitment occurs when a legal author-
ity transfers a person to a mental hospital against their will due to mental illness, drug use, or other 
reasons. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2020). 
 5 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 
2020) (No. 20-819). 
 6 See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/gun-violence-statistics/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZHC-Q3JN] (estimating that there are 393 million guns in America, more than any 
other wealthy nation); Mental Health Statistics, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.
nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml [https://perma.cc/BSV9-UEGX] (estimating that 11.2 
million American adults were living with a serious mental illness in 2017). Serious Mental Illness 
refers to any “mental, behavioral, or emotional” condition that significantly affects an individual’s 
ability to perform at least one major life activity. Mental Health Statistics, supra. 
 7 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117 (referencing a study published in the British Journal of Psychiatry 
concluding that individuals with a prior involuntary commitment experience “a combined ‘suicide risk 
39 times that expected’” (quoting E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for 
Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 220 (1997))); Gun Violence Sta-
tistics, supra note 6 (noting that access to a firearm “triples suicide risk”). 
 8 See infra notes 11–56 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 57–106 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 107–134 and accompanying text. 
2021] Applying Heller to the Involuntarily Committed II.-3 
I. HELLER, GUN CONTROL, AND THE TWO-STEP FRAMEWORK 
In 2020, in Mai v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit considered an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and con-
cluded that the law did not violate the plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights.11 
Section A of this Part introduces the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller where the Court first described the nature and 
“core” of the Second Amendment’s protections.12 Section B considers the ori-
gins of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the purpose of § 922(g).13 Section C 
discusses how federal courts have interpreted and applied Heller to resolve 
more recent Second Amendment challenges.14 Finally, Section D examines the 
factual background and procedural history of Mai.15 
A. Heller: A Clash of History and Original Understanding 
The Second Amendment provides that “the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”16 For more than two hundred years, the Su-
preme Court did not hear a case that required it to clarify the Amendment’s 
meaning.17 In 2008, however, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court con-
ducted a robust historical and textual analysis and concluded that the Second 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 
2020) (No. 20-819). An as-applied challenge argues that a law is unconstitutional given a particular 
set of facts. Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In contrast, a facial challenge 
contends that a law is per se unconstitutional. Id. 
 12 See infra notes 16–29 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 37–44 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 17 See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2(b) 
(7th ed. 2020) (discussing the history of the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence and suggesting 
that prior cases did not necessitate an explanation of the Amendment’s meaning). Prior to the Court’s 
2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the seminal case in Second Amendment jurisprudence 
was United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). See Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive 
Arms After District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009) (suggesting that dif-
fering interpretations of Miller “dominated” Second Amendment jurisprudence prior to Heller). Jack-
son Miller was a member of a depression-era criminal gang that committed a series of audacious 
heists. Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 48, 53 
(2008). In 1938, Oklahoma and Arkansas state police pulled Miller over while he was on his way to 
Claremore, Arkansas, where he was apparently planning to commit another robbery. Id. at 58. Miller 
was arrested and charged with violating the National Firearms Act after the police found an unregis-
tered, short-barreled shotgun in the car. Id. He maintained that the Act violated his Second Amend-
ment rights, and the district court agreed. Id. at 60. On appeal, a unanimous Supreme Court held that 
because the weapon had no reasonable relationship to the militia, the Second Amendment did not 
protect its possession and use. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.  
II.-4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
Amendment secures an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense.18 
The issue in Heller was whether the District’s ban on handguns violated the 
Second Amendment.19 In its decision, the Court described self-defense as the 
“core” of the right to bear arms.20 It reasoned that, because the handgun is 
America’s weapon of choice for self-defense, the District’s ban infringed upon 
the core of the right and was therefore unconstitutional.21 The Court ruled, 
however, that the right has limits.22 For example, it explained that certain well-
established regulations, such as those barring individuals with a mental illness 
from possessing firearms, are “presumptively lawful.”23 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (holding that the text and history 
of the Second Amendment demonstrate that it grants an individual right to possess firearms for self-
defense). 
 19 Id. at 628. Several District of Columbia provisions were at issue in Heller. Id. at 574–75. The 
District criminalized carrying an unregistered gun while simultaneously barring handgun registration. 
Id. A separate provision prohibited carrying an unlicensed handgun and authorized the chief of police 
to issue one-year licenses. Id. at 576. In addition, the District enacted certain gun storage require-
ments. Id. It ordered guns stored within a home to be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a 
trigger lock or similar device.” D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2008); Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. The plaintiff 
in Heller was a special police officer who legally carried a handgun while on duty. 554 U.S. at 575. 
He filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia after the District denied his appli-
cation to register and store his gun at his home. Id. at 575–76. He apparently wanted to keep a gun in 
his home because he lived near a “troubled” public housing project. Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘The Cul-
ture’s Changed’: Gun Rights Supporters Mark 10 Years Since Landmark Ruling Toppled D.C. Gun 
Ban, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/the-cultures-changed-
gun-rights-supporters-mark-10-years-since-landmark-ruling-toppled-dc-gun-ban/2018/06/26/02fdf
738-7890-11e8-bda2-f99f3863e603_story.html [https://perma.cc/FB99-JXXS]. 
 20 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that the Second Amendment primarily protects “the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). 
 21 Id. at 628–29. The Court characterized the District’s regulations as one of the most “severe” 
gun regimes in the nation’s history. Id. at 628. The Court determined that it was irrelevant that the 
District permitted residents to possess other kinds of firearms at home because it reasoned that hand-
guns are uniquely important to self-defense. Id. The Court suggested a number of reasons as to why 
someone might prefer to use a handgun for self-defense, including that a person can use it while sim-
ultaneously calling the police. Id. Regardless of the reason, the Court explained that the handgun’s 
sheer popularity for self-defense rendered the ban unconstitutional. Id. 
 22 Id. at 595. For example, the Court held that the right extends only to ordinary weapons. Id. at 
627. Indeed, according to the Court, just as the First Amendment does not protect all speech, the Sec-
ond Amendment does not grant a right to possess a gun for every kind of confrontation. Id. at 595. 
Although the Court in Heller analogized the reach of the Second Amendment to that of the First 
Amendment, the question of who is included in “the people”—a term used in both—is a fiercely con-
tested question in constitutional law, especially in the Second Amendment context. See Maria Strac-
qualursi, Note, Undocumented Immigrants Caught in the Crossfire: Resolving the Circuit Split on 
“The People” and the Applicable Level of Scrutiny for Second Amendment Challenges, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 1447, 1461–64 (2016) (explaining that the Court in Heller concluded that the phrase is a term of 
art and has the same meaning throughout the Bill of Rights but suggesting that the Court’s use of 
slightly different language throughout its decision in Heller muddled the issue). 
 23 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. The Court emphasized that its decision did not “cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools, government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. The Court 
2021] Applying Heller to the Involuntarily Committed II.-5 
Central to the Court’s decision in Heller was how the framing generation 
understood the scope of the right to bear arms.24 The majority acknowledged 
that the Framers adopted the Second Amendment to address the concern that 
an oppressive government could disarm the militia, but nonetheless decided 
that the scope of the right is not limited to a militia context.25 The Court held 
that the Second Amendment codified the English common-law right to bear 
arms, which centered around self-defense.26 Justice Stevens’s dissent, however, 
challenged that version of history.27 Drawing on the Amendment’s drafting 
history, he suggested that the right was limited to a militia context.28 
In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court reiterated 
that the core of the right is to own a firearm for self-defense, and once again 
emphasized that “longstanding” prohibitions barring individuals with mental 
illness from owning firearms are “presumptively lawful.”29 
                                                                                                                           
emphasized that its list of “presumptively lawful” regulations was not exhaustive, but merely illustra-
tive. Id. at 626–27 & n.26. 
 24 See id. at 576–77 (explaining that courts must interpret the Constitution’s text in light of its 
“normal” meaning according to a typical founding-era citizen). 
 25 See id. at 599 (distinguishing between the reason the right was codified and the right itself and 
suggesting that the framing generation also valued the right to bear arms for purposes of hunting and 
self-defense). 
 26 See id. at 593–94 (discussing the history that led the English Crown to guarantee an arms-
bearing right and explaining that it is viewed as the predecessor to the Second Amendment). The 
Court viewed William Blackstone’s reflections on the English right as strong evidence that the Second 
Amendment was not limited to a militia context. Id. at 594. Blackstone recognized the English guar-
antee as the right to keep and use arms “for self-preservation and defence.” Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140). The Court also pointed to several arms-bearing provisions in 
contemporary state constitutions as evidence that the founding generation understood the animating con-
cern of the Second Amendment to be self-defense. Id. at 600–01. It reasoned that Pennsylvania’s 1776 
Constitution strongly suggested as much because it explicitly guaranteed a right to bear arms for self-
defense. Id. at 601. Justice Stevens responded that, in light of such explicit provisions, the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s omission of such language combined with the Amendment’s preamble suggests that the constitu-
tional right was designed for another purpose. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 27 See id. at 637 (contending that arguments made at the time of adoption demonstrate that the 
Framers did not codify “the common-law right of self-defense”). 
 28 Id. at 646. According to Justice Stevens, opponents of the Constitution were acutely concerned 
that Congress could disarm state militias. Id. at 655. In response, several states, including Virginia and 
New York, proposed amendments to ensure that the militias would not be disarmed. Id. New Hampshire 
submitted an amendment that went further, providing a wider range of firearm protections. Id. For 
Justice Stevens, James Madison’s incorporation of the narrower, militia-focused language evidenced an 
intent to reject a self-defense rationale. Id. at 660. 
 29 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (emphasizing that the Court’s holding 
did not call into question “longstanding” prohibitions barring felons and the mentally ill from pos-
sessing firearms). McDonald v. City of Chicago, which the Court decided in 2010, involved a chal-
lenge to a Chicago ordinance that practically barred handgun possession within the city. Id. at 750. In 
McDonald, the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment against the states and then re-
manded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for additional proceedings. Id. at 
750, 791. Because the District of Columbia is not a state, Heller had not addressed the question of 
incorporation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620 n.23 (majority opinion). 
II.-6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
B. The Gun Control Act and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
In response to rising crime rates and the assassinations of President John 
F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Congress passed the Gun Control 
Act in 1968.30 In doing so, Congress sought to keep guns away from danger-
ous individuals.31 As such, § 922(g) of the Act prohibits certain classes of peo-
ple, including individuals who have been “adjudicated as a mental defective or 
who ha[ve] been committed to any mental institution,” from buying and pos-
sessing firearms.32 
Individuals whose firearm rights were revoked under § 922(g)(4) theoret-
ically have two mechanisms to restore their federal firearm rights.33 Individu-
als may either petition the U.S. Attorney General or, if they reside in a state 
with a qualifying program, petition a state court for relief.34 In 1992, however, 
Congress defunded the Attorney General relief mechanism because it believed 
the decision to restore a mentally ill person’s firearm rights was too precari-
ous.35 As a result, individuals who § 922(g)(4) bars from buying or possessing 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; Christopher M. Johnson, Note, Second Class: Heller, Age, 
and the Prodigal Amendment, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1593 n.45 (2017) (discussing the legislative 
history of the Gun Control Act of 1968).  
 31 James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands of the Dangerously 
Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 388 (2011). Congress was particularly concerned about individuals 
whose mental illness might provoke them to commit violent crime spontaneously. Brief for the Appel-
lees at 2, Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (No. 17-3010). 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Federal regulations define a commitment as “[a] formal commitment of 
a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority.” 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.11 (2020). It specifically includes involuntary commitments and excludes hospital admissions 
that are voluntary or merely for observation. Id. In Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit explained 
that due process requires a finding that the person is “both mentally ill and dangerous.” 952 F.3d 
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 2020) (No. 20-819). Moreover, if a 
state’s process for committing individuals with mental illness lacks sufficient judicial involvement, it 
does not constitute a commitment under § 922(g)(4). Id. A mental institution includes any facility in 
which licensed medical providers diagnose mental illness. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. Mental defective refers 
to a legal determination that a person’s mental condition renders them either “a danger to [themself] or 
others” or unable to “manage [their] own affairs.” Id. 
 33 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111. 
 34 Id. at 1111–12. To qualify, state relief programs must comply with 34 U.S.C. § 40915, which 
itself identifies three requirements. 34 U.S.C. § 40915. First, the program must allow individuals 
whose federal firearm rights were revoked under § 922(g)(4) to apply to the state for relief. Id. Sec-
ond, it must ensure that relief is granted when there is a determination that the individual is unlikely to 
pose a threat to public safety and doing so is not in conflict with the public interest. Id. Third, the 
program must allow for a court to review denials de novo. Id. 
 35 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111. Congress expressed concern that, even after a Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) investigation, it is impossible to determine whether an individ-
ual is dangerous. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 31, at 4. It explained that the program required 
executive-branch officials to make a determination knowing that any error could be fatal. Id. 
2021] Applying Heller to the Involuntarily Committed II.-7 
firearms and who reside in a state without a qualifying program have no reme-
dy to restore their federal firearm rights.36 
C. Post-Heller Challenges: The Two-Step Framework 
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller declined to deter-
mine the appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating whether a particular re-
striction violates the Second Amendment.37 Instead, it simply explained that 
the scope of a constitutional right is the product of the people’s understanding 
at the time of its adoption.38 With little guidance from the Court, lower courts 
post-Heller have adopted a two-step test to determine whether an act violates 
the Second Amendment.39 That framework first analyzes whether the re-
striction at issue burdens conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment 
as it was historically understood.40 If the law at issue falls outside the scope of 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115 (explaining that absent congressional or state action, § 922(g)(4) 
amounts to a permanent ban for individuals living in states without qualifying restoration programs). The 
latest U.S. Department of Justice statistics indicate that as of 2018, thirty states had qualifying programs. 
NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009–2018, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=491#Summary [https://perma.cc/2NP2-BXSJ]. 
 37 See 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (rejecting an interest-balancing approach and explaining the 
scope of a right is enshrined when codified). To determine whether a challenged law is consistent with 
the Constitution, courts typically apply one of three tiers of scrutiny: rational basis review, intermedi-
ate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. Brett Snider, FINDLAW BLOG, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Scrutiny 
Explained (Jan. 27, 2014), https://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2014/01/challenging-laws-3-levels-
of-scrutiny-explained.html [https://perma.cc/LY2E-YKGU]. Rational basis review is highly deferen-
tial to government action. Rational-Basis Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11. It only 
requires that the government demonstrate “a reasonable relationship” between the law at issue and “a 
legitimate governmental objective” for the law to withstand the challenge. Id. In contrast, under strict 
scrutiny, the government must provide a “compelling interest” to substantiate the law at issue. Strict 
Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11. Finally, intermediate scrutiny requires the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the law’s objective is “significant, substantial, or important” and that 
there is a “‘reasonable fit’ between the challenged law and the objective.” Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115 
(quoting Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 38 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (rejecting the traditional levels of scrutiny and explaining that 
the scope of enumerated rights is the product of interest balancing at the time of enactment). In his 
dissent, Justice Breyer contended that the historical inquiry should only be the start of the constitu-
tional analysis. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer recommended that courts apply an 
interest-balancing test to resolve Second Amendment challenges. Id. at 689–90. 
 39 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that the Ninth 
Circuit joined other appellate courts in adopting a two-step framework for Second Amendment chal-
lenges). There is disagreement on the level of analytical guidance that Heller provides. Compare Hel-
ler v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that Heller and McDonald rule out the traditional tiers of scrutiny and clearly require courts to 
evaluate firearms regulations solely in light of the Second Amendment’s text, history, and tradition), 
with Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths 
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1696 (2012) (averring that Heller provided 
no analytical framework for future Second Amendment challenges). 
 40 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113 (explaining that post-Heller, the Ninth Circuit has employed a two-
step approach in which step one asks whether the law at issue infringes on constitutionally protected 
II.-8 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
the Amendment, it is constitutional.41 If, however, the measure does burden the 
right to bear arms, courts then determine the proper level of scrutiny and apply 
it.42 Since Heller, several circuits have heard as-applied challenges to § 922(g) 
prohibitions.43 In doing so, nearly every court has ruled that intermediate scru-
tiny is appropriate for restrictions that burden the right to bear arms.44 
D. Factual and Procedural History of Mai 
In Mai, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the application of 
§ 922(g)(4) to the plaintiff, who had allegedly recovered from his mental ill-
ness, violated the Second Amendment.45 In 1999, a Washington state court in-
voluntarily committed the plaintiff after it concluded that he was mentally ill 
and dangerous.46 As a result, he lost his firearm rights under both state and 
federal law.47 The plaintiff claimed he had since recovered.48 Approximately 
fourteen years after his discharge, he successfully petitioned for restoration of 
his state firearm rights.49 He then attempted to purchase a gun, but § 922(g)(4) 
                                                                                                                           
conduct). In doing so, courts imitate the Supreme Court’s historical survey in Heller at step one. See, 
e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (surveying the history of federal firearms regulation to conclude that 
prohibitions on domestic violence misdemeanants are a modern creation); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
651 F.3d 684, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2011) (reviewing various eighteenth and nineteenth-century gun regu-
lations to determine whether target practice is within the Second Amendment’s scope). 
 41 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 42 See id. (explaining that the Sixth Circuit’s test for Second Amendment challenges requires 
courts to determine and apply the proper level of scrutiny if the regulated conduct or class is not “cat-
egorically unprotected” or the historical evidence is inconclusive). 
 43 See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2016) (evaluating two as-
applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from buying or pos-
sessing firearms); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) (considering an as-
applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which bars those convicted of domestic violence offenses 
from buying or possessing firearms). 
 44 Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 823 (9th Cir. 2016) (surveying the approaches of the Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits and concluding that, post-Heller, there is “near una-
nimity” that intermediate scrutiny applies to regulations that burden Second Amendment rights).  
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 328–29 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that strict scrutiny 
applies to § 922(g)(4) as-applied challenges), rev’d en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 45 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1109. 
 46 Id. at 1110. At age seventeen, the plaintiff was committed for over nine months after he threat-
ened himself and others. Id. 
 47 Complaint at 3, Mai v. United States, No. C17-0056, 2018 WL 784582 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 
2018), aff’d, 952 F.3d 1106. 
 48 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110. The plaintiff claimed to have fully recovered from his mental health 
condition, explaining that he was no longer taking any medication. Complaint, supra note 47, at 4. 
After his release, the plaintiff earned a bachelor’s in microbiology from the University of Washington 
and a masters in microbiology from the University of Southern California. Id. at 3. He then worked as 
a researcher, including at the Benaroya Research Institute, where he underwent and passed an FBI 
background check. Id. 
 49 Complaint, supra note 47, at 4. 
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prohibited him from doing so.50 He filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Washington claiming that the continued application 
of § 922(g)(4) violated his Second Amendment rights.51 The court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the provision was “presumptively 
lawful” under Heller.52 
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.53 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not determine whether 
§ 922(g)(4) burdened the Second Amendment.54 Instead, the court simply as-
sumed that it did.55 It decided that intermediate scrutiny applied and held that 
§ 922(g)(4) was a reasonable fit in light of the federal government’s important 
public safety interests.56 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Mai, 2018 WL 784582, at *1. Federal law governing the restoration of firearm rights has a 
more demanding standard than the corresponding Washington State law. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112. 
Washington State’s relief program does not qualify under 34 U.S.C. § 40915 because it merely re-
quires a determination that an individual is not a substantial threat to his own safety or that of the 
public, whereas the federal standard necessitates a finding that the individual is unlikely to pose a 
danger to the public. Id. In addition, unlike Washington State law, federal law requires that the resto-
ration of the petitioner’s firearm rights not conflict with the public interest. Id. 
 51 Complaint, supra note 47, at 5–6. The plaintiff named seven defendants: the United States, the 
Department of Justice, ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as the relevant heads of each 
agency. Id. at 2. 
 52 Mai, 2018 WL 784582, at *4, *7. The district court relied on United States v. Vongxay, in 
which the Ninth Circuit considered the “presumptively lawful” regulations identified in Heller an 
essential part of the Supreme Court’s decision. Id. at *4; see United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 
1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta binding). The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s 2012 decision in Petramala v. U.S. Department of Justice also guided the district court’s deci-
sion. Mai, 2018 WL 784582, at *4.; see Petramala v. Dep’t of Just., 481 F. App’x 395, 396 (9th Cir. 
2012). There, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an as-applied challenge, con-
cluding that § 922(g)(4) is an acceptable restraint on the right to bear arms. Petramala, 481 F. App’x 
at 396. 
 53 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112. 
 54 Id. at 1109. The Ninth Circuit followed its approach in Pena v. Lindley. Id. at 1115; see Pena v. 
Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2018). There, the court assumed that the challenged provision 
burdened the plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights because it reasoned that the provision was consti-
tutional regardless of whether it did so. Pena, 898 F.3d at 976. 
 55 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. 
 56 Id. at 1109. In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the plaintiff filed a petition for a panel and 
en banc rehearing, which the court denied. Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(mem.). Three judges—Judge Daniel Collins, Judge Patrick Bumatay, and Judge Lawrence Van-
dyke—authored separate dissents on the denial of the en banc rehearing. Id. at 1082. Each judge’s 
dissent criticized the panel’s application of intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 1083 (Collins, J., dissent-
ing on denial of rehearing en banc) (describing the court’s version of intermediate scrutiny as “seri-
ously flawed”); id. at 1094–95 (Bumatay, J., dissenting on denial of rehearing en banc) (claiming that 
the court’s version of intermediate scrutiny permitted the government to rely on insufficient data to 
meet its burden); id. at 1106 (VanDyke, J., dissenting on denial of rehearing en banc) (labeling the 
panel’s version of scrutiny “toothless”). 
II.-10 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
II. DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Since the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have each considered 
as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).57 Although all three circuits 
have adopted a version of the widely-used two-step framework to resolve Sec-
ond Amendment challenges, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits diverge on whether 
the provision survives intermediate scrutiny.58 Unlike its sister courts, the 
Third Circuit resolved the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) at step one of its in-
quiry and held that it regulates activity beyond the scope of the Amendment.59 
Section A of this Part summarizes how the Sixth Circuit first determined 
that individuals with mental illness are not beyond the Second Amendment’s 
reach before it concluded that § 922(g)(4) cannot withstand intermediate scru-
tiny.60 Section B describes how the Third Circuit adopted a version of the same 
two-step approach as the Sixth Circuit but concluded that § 922(g)(4) does not 
burden constitutionally protected conduct.61 Finally, Section C recounts how in 
2020, in Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit resolved the plaintiff’s as-
applied challenge, holding that § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny.62 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Ruling in Tyler 
In 2016, in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered whether § 922(g)(4) violated the Second 
Amendment as applied to a plaintiff who had been involuntarily committed 
thirty years prior, but who was no longer mentally ill.63 The en banc panel 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (barring persons with a prior involuntary commitment from pos-
sessing or buying firearms); Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020) (evaluating an 
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4)), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 2020) (No. 20-819); Beers v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot sub nom. Beers v. Barr 140 S. Ct. 
2758 (2020) (mem.) (same); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(same). 
 58 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1109, 1113 (using the two-step test and holding that § 922(g)(4) survives 
intermediate scrutiny); Beers, 927 F.3d at 153, 159 (adopting the two-step framework and not reach-
ing the scrutiny question because it held § 922(g)(4) was beyond the scope of the Amendment’s pro-
tections); Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681, 685–86 (adopting the two-step test and ruling that § 922(g)(4) does 
not withstand intermediate scrutiny). 
 59 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159. 
 60 See infra notes 63–76 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 77–92 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 63 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681. In 2011, the plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm, but § 922(g)(4) 
blocked him from doing so. Id. at 684. In 1986, a Michigan state court committed him after it concluded 
that he was a threat to himself and others. Id. at 683. In 1985, the plaintiff’s wife of more than twenty 
years reportedly left him for another man, drained his finances, and filed for divorce. Id. He became 
distressed. Id. According to him, however, the incident was the only “depressive episode” he had ever 
experienced. Id. at 683–84. 
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adopted a two-step approach to address the question.64 First, the court exam-
ined whether the restriction fell within the scope of the Amendment’s protec-
tions as they were historically understood.65 After determining that the histori-
cal record was inconclusive, the court evaluated the government’s basis for the 
restriction.66 
At step one, the Sixth Circuit clarified that the proper focus of the histori-
cal inquiry is on whether the Amendment’s protections include individuals liv-
ing with mental illness, rather than on specific conduct, because § 922(g)(4) is 
a class-based prohibition.67 The court accepted that the Framers intended to 
limit the Second Amendment’s protections to “virtuous” citizens, but decided 
that the record did not establish precisely who met that description at the time 
of the framing.68 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the government did 
not meet its burden of demonstrating that the class was beyond the reach of the 
Amendment.69 
It then turned to the question of scrutiny.70 The Sixth Circuit held that in-
termediate scrutiny was appropriate because it compels the government to de-
fend the need for the provision, while also giving it room to regulate guns.71 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. at 685. The Sixth Circuit initially considered the case in 2014 after the plaintiff appealed the 
district court’s dismissal. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). There, the Sixth Circuit determined that persons with mental 
illness are not “categorically unprotected” by the Second Amendment and held that strict scrutiny ap-
plied. Id. at 322, 328–29. It then remanded to the district court to declare § 922(g)(4) unconstitutional 
as applied to the plaintiff. Id. at 344. 
 65 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 685. 
 66 Id. at 689. At both steps of the inquiry, the Sixth Circuit placed the burden on the government. 
See id. at 685–86 (explaining that the government must demonstrate that the regulation falls outside 
the Second Amendment’s scope and that the government must demonstrate its constitutionality under 
heightened scrutiny). Before applying the law, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged a “tension” between 
District of Columbia v. Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta and the two-step framework. Id. at 689–
90; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008) (providing a non-
exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful” regulations). It reasoned that restrictions on the mentally ill 
may be “presumptively lawful” either because they fit within the historical understanding of the right 
or because they survive heightened scrutiny. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 690. Because the Court in Heller did 
not identify a “historical justification[]” for those measures, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Su-
preme Court was likely presuming such laws would survive heightened scrutiny. Id. 
 67 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 688. 
 68 Id. at 689. To meet its burden in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the govern-
ment emphasized, among other historical evidence, a Samuel Adams proposal from the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention. Id. Adams advocated against any constitutional interpretation that would bar 
“peaceable citizens” from bearing arms. Id. (quoting Samuel Adams’ proposal at the Massachusetts 
ratifying convention, reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 675, 681 (Leon Friedman et al. eds., 1971)). The court concluded, however, that such evi-
dence was too vague to discern who the framing generation considered virtuous. Id. 
 69 Id. at 690. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 692. The court quickly ruled out rational basis review. See id. at 690 (noting that Heller 
explicitly rejected that tier of scrutiny). It then explained that strict scrutiny would be inconsistent 
with Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta. See id. at 691 (explaining that applying strict scrutiny to 
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The court reasoned that the right to bear arms is unique because it poses a dan-
ger to others.72 It also observed that federal appellate courts have applied in-
termediate scrutiny to other § 922(g) prohibitions that impose similar bur-
dens.73 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the court recognized two legitimate 
government interests: policing crime and combatting suicide.74 The court con-
cluded, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish a “reasonable 
fit” between the provision and the government’s public safety interests.75 The 
court held that the government failed to demonstrate that a lifetime firearm ban 
was reasonably necessary for all previously committed persons.76 
B. The Third Circuit’s Holding in Beers 
In 2019, in Beers v. Attorney General United States, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered a similar as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4).77 In 
2005, the plaintiff was committed to a psychiatric hospital.78 A state court sub-
sequently determined that the plaintiff was a risk to himself and twice extended 
his commitment.79 Within a year of his release, he attempted, but failed, to 
purchase a gun.80 In 2017, he filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the East-
                                                                                                                           
§ 922(g)(4) would contradict Heller’s logic that barring individuals with a mental illness from pos-
sessing firearms is “presumptively lawful”). 
 72 Id. at 692. 
 73 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying interme-
diate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition for domestic violence misdemeanants); United 
States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(3)’s prohibition on persons addicted to controlled substances). 
 74 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693. The court held that both interests were “compelling.” Id. 
 75 Id. at 699. The court acknowledged that the evidence showed that “relapse and readmission” 
often do occur after an involuntary commitment. Id. at 696. It noted, however, that the studies in the 
record focused on behavior over a relatively short period of time, from a single year to just twenty-two 
months. Id. Therefore, the court determined that such data did not shed light on the risk that individu-
als like the plaintiff pose decades later. Id. 
 76 Id. at 699. Notably, the court also determined that Congress disagreed with the government’s 
position. Id. at 698. In 2008, after a mentally ill man gunman attacked Virginia Tech, Congress of-
fered federal grants to states in exchange for submitting improved data to the National Instant Crimi-
nal Background Check System. Id. To qualify for the grants, states had to create a federally compliant 
relief program for individuals § 922(g)(4) prohibited from possessing a firearm. Id. The Sixth Circuit 
interpreted that Act as evidence that Congress rejected the view that the previously committed are so 
dangerous a class to justify barring them from ever possessing a firearm. Id. 
 77 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot sub nom. Beers v. 
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.). 
 78 Beers, 927 F.3d at 152. In 2005, the then-nineteen-year-old plaintiff was “distressed” because 
he was struggling in school. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 
(2020) (mem.). He reportedly indicated to his mother that he was suicidal and placed a gun in his 
mouth. Beers, 927 F.3d at 152. A doctor examined the plaintiff at the hospital and concluded that he 
needed inpatient treatment. Id. 
 79 Beers, 927 F.3d at 152. 
 80 Id. 
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ern District of Pennsylvania claiming that § 922(g)(4) violated his Second 
Amendment rights.81 
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the provision was 
constitutional because it did not infringe upon conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment.82 On appeal, the Third Circuit explained that it had previously 
adopted a two-part test for Second Amendment challenges.83 Notably, before 
applying the two-part test, the court emphasized that it had previously held that 
“neither passage of time nor evidence of rehabilitation” were relevant.84 The 
Third Circuit variant on the two-part test required the plaintiff to first articulate 
the historic rationale for excluding the class at issue and then to differentiate 
his situation from that of the class.85 Only if the plaintiff could successfully do 
both would the burden then shift to the government to satisfy heightened scru-
tiny.86 
The court reasoned that historically, persons with mental illness have 
been excluded from possessing firearms because they were a threat to public 
safety.87 The court reiterated that its historical analysis offered no evidence 
indicating that firearm rights could be restored.88 Accordingly, to succeed, the 
plaintiff needed to prove that he never posed a threat to himself or others.89 A 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 153. The plaintiff initially brought suit challenging § 922(g)(4) and an analogous state 
provision. Beers v. Lynch, No. 2:16-cv-6440, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 
2017), aff’d sub nom. Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot sub 
nom. Beers v. Barr 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.). 
 82 Beers, 927 F.3d at 153. The district court ruled that it was irrelevant whether the plaintiff had 
recovered from his mental illness, explaining that § 922(g)(4) does not include such an exception. 
Beers, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492, at *10–11. It also reasoned that there is no historical practice 
of restoring mentally ill individuals’ firearm rights after they have recovered. Id. at *11. 
 83 Beers, 927 F.3d at 153. In its 2010 decision in United States v. Marzzarella, the Third Circuit 
interpreted Heller to require a two-part inquiry. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 84 Beers, 927 F.3d at 156. In 2016, in Binderup v. Attorney General United States, the Third Cir-
cuit considered an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), which bars felons from possessing firearms. 
836 F.3d 336, 343 (3d Cir. 2016). There, the court was unequivocal: no historical evidence supports 
the idea that the right to bear arms must be restored after some period of time or after a finding of 
rehabilitation. Id. at 350. It deemed any congressional remedy “a matter of legislative grace.” Id. In 
other words, the court determined that the Constitution does not demand a remedy, but Congress may 
nonetheless choose to restore a group’s Second Amendment rights. See id. (holding that the Second 
Amendment does not require Congress to establish a rights-restoration program for convicted felons). 
Following Binderup, plaintiffs in the Third Circuit must show that they were not convicted of a seri-
ous crime to differentiate themselves from the “historically-barred class” of felons. Beers, 927 F.3d at 
156. The Third Circuit in Binderup also highlighted the judiciary’s own limitations, explaining that 
courts are ill-suited to determine whether an individual is truly rehabilitated and no longer poses a 
danger to the public. Id. 
 85 Beers, 927 F.3d at 155. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 158. 
 88 Id.; see Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350. 
 89 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159. 
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state court, however, had previously found that to be true.90 The Third Circuit 
determined that the plaintiff could not separate himself from the barred class.91 
The Third Circuit, therefore, held that § 922(g)(4) did not violate his Second 
Amendment rights.92 
C. Mai: The Ninth Circuit Framework 
In 2020, in Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied the prevailing two-step framework to evaluate the plaintiff’s as-applied 
challenge.93 The court reasoned that a law does not burden the Second 
Amendment if it is either “presumptively lawful” under Heller or if the class at 
issue was traditionally beyond the Amendment’s reach.94 The Ninth Circuit 
observed that Heller explicitly identified categorical bans on the mentally ill as 
“presumptively lawful,” and that there was strong evidence that the Second 
Amendment did not historically protect individuals living with mental ill-
ness.95 The court, however, assumed, without deciding, that § 922(g)(4) in-
fringed upon the plaintiff’s right to bear arms.96 It then considered the proper 
level of scrutiny to apply.97 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. 
91 Id. 
 92 Id. In May 2020, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758, 
2759 (2020) (mem.). Subsequently, Pennsylvania created a “restoration-of-rights” program that com-
plied with the federal requirements. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition at 6–7, Beers v. 
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2578 (2020) (mem.) (No. 19-864). After ATF approved Pennsylvania’s certification, 
the plaintiff obtained relief through the program and purchased a firearm. Id. at 5, 7. As a result, there 
was no Article III controversy for a court to decide. See id. at 5. The Court therefore vacated the 
judgement and remanded the case to the Third Circuit, instructing it to dismiss the case as moot. Barr, 
140 S. Ct. at 2759. On September 25, 2020, the Third Circuit dismissed the case as moot. Beers v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 822 F. App’x 56, 57 (3d Cir. 2020) (mem.). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s analyti-
cal framework remains relevant. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 153 (applying the two-step framework to an 
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4)). 
 93 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113. 
 94 Id. at 1114. 
 95 Id. The Ninth Circuit observed that the government argued persuasively that § 922(g)(4) does 
not burden the plaintiff’s right to bear arms. Id. It noted that, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the 
Supreme Court explicitly included restrictions on the mentally ill in its list of “presumptively lawful” 
measures. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). The court also ex-
plained that § 922(g)(4) has been the law for decades. Id. It also endorsed the historical analysis set 
forth by the Third Circuit in Beers, which concluded that persons living with mental illness have been 
historically excluded from the scope of the Second Amendment. See id. (highlighting Beers for its 
historical overview, which indicated that the mentally ill were traditionally prohibited from possessing 
firearms). 
 96 Id. at 1115. The plaintiff acknowledged that § 922(g)(4) is constitutional as applied to individ-
uals who are currently living with a mental illness. Id. at 1114. He maintained, however, that the pro-
hibition was historically limited to that narrower group. Id. The Ninth Circuit chose not to resolve that 
issue. Id. Rather, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the plaintiff’s rights were burdened and proceeded to 
its level of scrutiny analysis, just as it did in Pena v. Lindley and as the Fourth Circuit did in Wollard 
v. Gallagher. Id. at 1114–15; see Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2018) (assuming the 
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To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, the court evaluated 
§ 922(g)(4)’s proximity to the core of the right to bear arms and the gravity of 
the provision’s encroachment on that right.98 It reasoned that § 922(g)(4) does 
not interfere with the core of the right because a person who has been involun-
tarily committed is not a “law-abiding, responsible citizen.”99 The court 
acknowledged that the burden was “substantial,” in that it could result in a life-
time ban.100 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the burden is diminished be-
cause it only affects a small subset of society unconnected to the core of the 
right.101 Thus, the court chose to apply intermediate scrutiny.102 
In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit identified two im-
portant government interests: reducing crime and combatting suicide.103 Most 
importantly, it determined that the scientific evidence the government submit-
ted, which indicated an increased suicide risk more than a decade after a pa-
tient’s discharge, supported Congress’s conclusion that individuals who have 
been involuntarily committed present a higher risk of violence well after their 
release.104 According to the court, Congress need not justify its decision with 
“scientific precision.”105 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, departed from the Sixth 
                                                                                                                           
law at issue burdened protected conduct because the law nonetheless withstands heightened scrutiny); 
Wollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the court may assume that the 
challenged provision burdens protected conduct because it survived the appropriate level of scrutiny). 
 97 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (defining the core of the right as “the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”). Applying the logic of United States 
v. Chovan, the court explained that a person is not “a law-abiding, responsible citizen,” even if they 
are no longer living with a mental illness, if their condition once required the state to formally inter-
vene and commit them. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115; see Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (concluding that 
§ 922(g)(9)’s prohibition for domestic violence misdemeanants does not burden the core of the Sec-
ond Amendment because those with a criminal conviction are not law-abiding). 
 100 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. 
 101 Id.; see Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 691 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the burden was lessened because § 922(g)(4) does not apply to the general public). That the Ninth 
Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny to other permanent bans under § 922(g) provided additional 
support for the court’s conclusion. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. 
 102 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115. 
 103 Id. at 1116. Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit concluded that those public safety inter-
ests are “compelling.” Id.; see Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693 (concluding that the government’s interests in 
preventing crime and suicide are compelling). 
 104 Mai, 952 F.3d. at 1118. For example, the court highlighted a study in the record that examined 
the suicide risk of patients more than a decade after their release. Id. The study evaluated some patients 
for fifteen years following their release from treatment and found that their suicide risk was still “seven 
times that expected.’” Id. (quoting E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for 
Mental Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 220 (1997)). 
 105 Id. (quoting Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 2018)). The court differentiated be-
tween the evidence required to sustain legislation and that required to secure a conviction in a criminal 
case. Id. Congress need only rely on evidence that “fairly supports” its “reasonable” judgment. Id. (quot-
ing Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 969 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
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Circuit’s holding and concluded that the ban was reasonable in light of Con-
gress’s public safety interests.106 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S AGILE APPROACH: SIDE-STEPPING AMBIGUOUS 
HISTORY AND SETTING THE PROPER EVIDENTIARY BURDEN 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Mai v. 
United States recognized that it is unnecessary for courts to examine founding-
era history to decide whether the right to bear arms has historically applied to 
individuals with mental illness because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) nonetheless sur-
vives intermediate scrutiny.107 The court’s approach also rejected an overly 
stringent evidentiary standard, thereby giving Congress sufficient flexibility in 
policymaking.108 
Section A of this Part argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly side-stepped 
an exhaustive historical inquiry, acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller had already identified restrictions 
like § 922(g)(4) as “presumptively lawful” and that courts are ill-equipped to 
perform historical surveys.109 Section B endorses the Ninth Circuit’s deference 
to congressional decision-making because it recognized the realities of policy-
making and empowered legislatures to make reasonable, data-driven decisions 
concerning gun safety.110 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. at 1117. In September 2020, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiff’s petition for an en banc 
rehearing. Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem.). Circuit Judges Collins, 
Bumatay, and Vandyke filed separate dissenting opinions that criticized the Ninth Circuit panel’s ap-
proach and decision in Mai. Id. at 1082. Judge Bumatay suggested that Heller specifically prohibited 
courts from employing an interest-balancing approach and averred that the two-step analysis is just that. 
Id. at 1086 (Bumatay, J., dissenting on denial of rehearing en banc). In his view, Heller required judges 
to evaluate Second Amendment challenges solely in light of the Amendment’s history, tradition, and text. 
Id. Applying that logic to § 922(g)(4), Judge Bumatay concluded that the provision is unconstitutional 
because it restricts a class of persons from possessing firearms, and, at the time of the founding, gun 
regulations were limited to restricting conduct. Id. at 1088–90. Moreover, Judge Bumatay suggested that 
because the common law understood mental illness as a temporary condition, such a diagnosis did not 
result in the permanent revocation of rights. Id. at 1090. 
 107 See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that resolving 
which view is more historically accurate is unnecessary), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 9, 2020) 
(No. 20-819). The Ninth Circuit, relying on its logic in Pena v. Lindley, reasoned that even if 
§ 922(g)(4) burdened the plaintiff’s Second Amendment rights, the provision is still valid as applied 
to him because it survives intermediate scrutiny. See id.; Pena, 898 F.3d at 976 (endorsing that ap-
proach where the law at issue is valid regardless of whether it burdens protected conduct). 
 108 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118 (critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s judgement that the scientific evidence 
Congress relied upon is insufficient and explaining that, even when it is imperfect, courts should show 
deference to Congress’s decision). 
 109 See infra notes 111–124 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 125–134 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Ninth Circuit Approach Avoids Giving Undue  
Weight to Ambiguous History 
In Mai, the Ninth Circuit correctly avoided performing a lengthy histori-
cal analysis to determine whether individuals no longer living with mental ill-
ness are historically excluded from the Second Amendment’s protections.111 
This approach was not only faithful to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, 
but it also recognized that the history surrounding such exclusions is especially 
elusive, that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to perform such an inquiry, 
and that courts are vulnerable to weaponizing history.112 
In light of Heller, both the Third and Sixth Circuits turned to history to 
determine whether § 922(g)(4) burdens protected conduct.113 Nevertheless, the 
courts reached opposite results.114 In Mai, on the other hand, the Ninth Circuit 
allocated little time to parsing through colonial American history to determine 
the “true” scope of the right to bear arms.115 The wisdom of the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach is that, although history may offer some insight, it is unlikely to pro-
vide precise answers.116 That logic is especially applicable to restrictions on 
persons with mental illness because there had been no need for such measures 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1114 (explaining that it is unnecessary to decide which party’s view is 
better aligned with America’s historical tradition and assuming that § 922(g)(4) does burden the plain-
tiff’s Second Amendment rights). 
 112 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (noting gun ownership re-
strictions on individuals living with mental illness are “presumptively lawful”); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. 
Sherriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding the historical evidence on the Second 
Amendment’s application to the mentally ill to be inconclusive); Saul Cornell, Heller, New Original-
ism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 
1098 (2009) (describing the Court’s historical analysis in Heller as emblematic of “law office history” 
in which judges engineer a particular historical narrative to advance their political preferences); Cor-
nell, supra note 39, at 1697 (suggesting that differentiating between “law office history” and serious 
academic scholarship is a difficult task for judges in Second Amendment disputes). 
 113 See Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot sub nom. 
Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (examining the historical justifications for barring per-
sons with mental illness from possessing firearms); Tyler, 837 F.3d at 689–90 (same). 
 114 Compare Beers, 927 F.3d at 158 (concluding from the historical record that persons living 
with mental illness were traditionally disarmed because they posed a danger to themselves and/or their 
communities), with Tyler, 837 F.3d at 689 (concluding that the historical evidence was too vague to 
determine whether § 922(g)(4) burdens the right to bear arms). 
 115 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1114–15 (observing that the historical evidence backs up the notion that 
America disarmed persons living with mental illness because the country considered them a public 
safety risk before choosing not to decide whether § 922(g)(4) burdens Second Amendment rights). 
 116 See, e.g., Tyler, 837 F.3d at 689 (noting that the founding generation viewed the Second 
Amendment as applying only to virtuous citizens, but suggesting that the description is insufficient to 
identify who would have been considered so); cf. Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and 
the Second Amendment: A Closer Look at the Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 203–04 (2007) 
(arguing that there were several “constitutional discourses” on the Second Amendment in colonial 
America and that how each “vied for dominance” and changed poses difficulties for those relying on 
historical evidence). 
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during the eighteenth century.117 By presuming that § 922(g)(4) burdened pro-
tected conduct, the court focused its analysis on the heart of the issue: deter-
mining the proper level of constitutional scrutiny and applying it.118 
Proponents of a weighty historical analysis in Second Amendment juris-
prudence suggest that absent one, judges will be unable to determine the scope 
of the right.119 The Ninth Circuit, however, rightly deferred to the Supreme 
Court’s robust historical inquiry in Heller and proceeded to apply scrutiny with 
the Court’s conception of the core of the right guiding its analysis.120 As a 
practical matter, a thorough historical inquiry is a tall task for judges.121 It re-
quires them to sort through complicated, and at times conflicting, records and 
to discern what is historically accurate.122 Moreover, judges often disagree 
over which evidence and/or time period is pertinent to discerning the scope of 
the Second Amendment.123 Perhaps the gravest risk though is that judges will 
weaponize pieces of the historical record to reach a predetermined holding that 
aligns with their ideological agenda.124 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Beers, 927 F.3d at 157; see Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376–78 (2009) (sug-
gesting that because eighteenth-century justices of the peace could imprison “lunatics,” it is logical to 
presume that the founding generation would have understood prohibitions against gun ownership for 
persons with mental illness to be valid). 
 118 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115–19 (considering the proper level of constitutional scrutiny and 
deciding upon intermediate scrutiny). 
 119 See Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem.) (Bumatay, J., dissenting 
on denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Mai is “infect[ed]” 
because it omits the historical analysis and suggesting that engaging in such an analysis would have 
revealed that § 922(g)(4) burdens the core of the Second Amendment right). 
 120 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115 (determining the proper level of scrutiny in light of Heller’s ruling 
that the core of the Second Amendment is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of heath and home” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635))). 
 121 See Cornell, supra note 39, at 1697 (contending that it is difficult for judges to separate sound 
historical scholarship from advocacy disguised as historical scholarship in Second Amendment cases). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. at 1697 n.8 (identifying possible sources of historical evidence and noting that judges 
are divided over how to weigh and interpret them). For example, some judges interpret Heller to re-
quire a focus primarily on the founding period whereas others claim that it endorses a broad survey 
through at least the nineteenth century. Compare Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that Heller demon-
strates that courts may consider nineteenth and twentieth century sources at step one), with Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 
2013) (Jones, J., dissenting on denial of rehearing en banc) (reading Heller as creating a hierarchy of 
historical materials and suggesting that founding-era materials are most relevant).  
 124 See Cornell, supra note 112, at 1098 (criticizing the Court’s “new originalism” approach in 
Heller). Some scholars argue that Heller exemplifies “a results oriented methodology” whereby judg-
es can simply cherry-pick historical evidence to arrive at an ideologically-convenient conclusion. Id.; 
see Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 269 (2009) (observing that the justices in both the majority and minority in Heller unsur-
prisingly concluded that history supported their interpretations of the Second Amendment). 
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Proper Evidentiary Burden 
The Ninth Circuit’s evidentiary standard is far less strict than that of the 
Sixth Circuit, and it correctly recognizes that policymakers must often make 
prognostic decisions with incomplete information.125 The Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits agreed that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for as-applied challenges 
to § 922(g)(4), but diverged on whether the provision survives such scrutiny.126 
The Ninth Circuit’s analytical approach is correct because it recognizes the 
nature of policymaking and sets its burden accordingly.127 
In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that the government did not meet its burden of proving that 
§ 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban was reasonable.128 To impose such a burden, the 
court reasoned, the government would need to demonstrate that individuals 
who were involuntarily committed many years ago posed an ongoing risk to 
themselves or the public.129 In contrast, in Mai, the Ninth Circuit emphasized 
that the Second Amendment permits class prohibitions and rejected the Sixth 
Circuit’s overly individualized evidentiary standard.130 The Ninth Circuit right-
ly concluded that Congress may rely on any evidence that it believes is rele-
vant.131 Congress is entitled to such deference because it is institutionally bet-
ter equipped than a panel of judges to gather and analyze data as part of the 
policymaking process.132 When a court second-guesses a congressional judge-
ment that is both reasonable and data-driven, it improperly interferes with the 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Compare Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118 (concluding that courts should evaluate only whether policy 
decisions are “fairly support[ed]” by the evidence because legislating sometimes necessitates predicting 
the consequences of future events ) (quoting Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 969 (9th Cir. 
2014)), with Tyler, 837 F.3d at 696 (reasoning that evidence of an increased suicide risk twenty-two 
months after discharge is insufficient to conclude that the class poses an ongoing risk long after re-
lease). 
 126 Compare Mai, 952 F.3d at 1109 (ruling that § 922(g)(4) is a “reasonable fit” with the govern-
ment’s important interest in reducing gun violence), with Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699 (concluding that the 
government failed to demonstrate that § 922(g)(4) is a “reasonable fit” in light of its public safety 
interests). 
 127 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118 (explaining that to develop sage public policy, legislators and their 
staffs must sometimes predict future events and/or rely on incomplete data). The approach also recogniz-
es that data may change and Congress is better suited than the courts to respond. See Wilkinson, supra 
note 124, at 292, 299–300 (observing that “legislatures can amend laws when . . . social conditions 
change” whereas courts end the debate). 
 128 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699. 
 129 See id. (concluding that the government did not prove that individuals in the plaintiff’s cir-
cumstances pose a continued danger to themselves or the public and characterizing the government’s 
evidence as focusing on individuals currently living with mental illness and those recently released 
from commitment). 
 130 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1119 (explaining that Congress need only focus on persons with a mental 
illness as a class and that the Second Amendment does not require a personalized risk assessment). 
 131 See id. at 1118 (rejecting inflexible standards for congressional judgements). 
 132 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (explaining that legislatures 
are better positioned than courts to collect and evaluate data for drafting legislation). 
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legislature’s policy-making role.133 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mai adheres 
to this important principle.134 
CONCLUSION 
In Mai v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(4) survives 
intermediate scrutiny. The court appropriately followed the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in District of Columbia v. Heller and adopted the prevailing two-step 
framework widely used by federal appellate courts to resolve as-applied Sec-
ond Amendment challenges. Importantly, however, it sidestepped an exhaus-
tive historical analysis in step one, mindful that Heller had explicitly presumed 
that such regulations were lawful. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to evaluating 
§ 922(g)(4) challenges should be the model for federal courts. This is because
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to assume that § 922(g)(4) burdened the plaintiff’s 
Second Amendment rights permitted the court to focus on the heart of the is-
sue: whether the provision withstands heightened constitutional scrutiny. Im-
plicit in the Ninth Circuit’s approach was the recognition that courts are insti-
tutionally ill-equipped to conduct expansive historical inquires and that the
historical evidence related to disarming the mentally ill is ambiguous. Moreo-
ver, the court’s decision to apply intermediate scrutiny is consistent with the
only other federal appellate court to address the question.
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